Several recent commentators argue that Thomas Hobbes's account of the nature of science is conventionalist. Engaging in scientific practice on a conventionalist account is more a matter of making sure one connects one term to another properly rather than checking one's claims, e.g., by experiment. In this paper, I argue that the conventionalist interpretation of Hobbesian science accords neither with Hobbes's theoretical account in De corpore and Leviathan nor with Hobbes's scientific practice in De homine and elsewhere. Closely tied to the conventionalist interpretation is the deductivist interpretation, on which it is claimed that Hobbes believed sciences such as optics are deduced from geometry. I argue that Hobbesian science places simplest conceptions as the foundation for geometry and the sciences in which we use geometry, which provides strong evidence against both the conventionalist and deductivist interpretations.
1 day, though. He also engaged in it by doing work, for example, in the study of optics, and he considered his work in optics to rival his work in civil philosophy:
But if it be found true doctrine […] I shall deserve the reputation of having been ye first to lay the grounds of two sciences; this of Optiques, ye most curious, and ye other of Natural Justice, which I have done in my book De cive, ye most profitable of all other. 2 Hobbes presents his optics in Tractatus Opticus (1644), "A Minute or First Draught of the Optiques" (1646), and De homine (1658). In De homine, Hobbes not only works with optics generally but also discusses specific issues related to the microscope and telescope. 3 In Tractatus
Opticus, Hobbes recounts testing with an airgun Descartes' theory of refraction in Dioptrics. 4 Several recent commentators argue that Hobbes's account of the nature of science is conventionalist, according to which "determining scientific truth is purely a logico-linguistic matter." 5 Engaging in scientific practice on such an account is more a matter of making sure one connects one term to another properly rather than checking or testing one's claims, e.g., by interpretations. 7 Closely tied to the conventionalist interpretation is the deductivist view, on which it is claimed that Hobbes believed that sciences such as optics are deduced from geometry.
I discuss this view as it is relevant to the conventionalist interpretation.
A Case Study from Hobbesian Optics in De homine 2
Hobbes discusses two topics in De homine 2: the visual line and the perception of motion (de linea visuali, et perceptione motus). Hobbes desires to explain why an object appears sometimes smaller and other times larger and to explain why that object also appears sometimes one shape and other times different shapes (I also discuss below Hobbes's explanation for why objects appear in different locations). Hobbes notes that many individuals before him have tried to explain these phenomena, but no one to his knowledge has done so successfully because not one of them suspects that light and color are not striking our senses from the object; rather, he says, light and color are our phantasms (phantasmata nostra esse; see De homine 2.1 for these details). 8 Having noted that the subject matter of the science of optics is phantasms rather than the objects themselves, Hobbes proceeds to explain the phenomena relating to the appearances of objects. which wee see distinctly besides ye optique axis"; however, Alhazen's theory of vision also emphasizes that clear vision occurs at the perpendicular (i.e., the optic axis), arguing that refraction occurs so that rays are bent closer to the perpendicular.
10
For the proofs relating to the visual line to work, Hobbes must make reference at two crucial points in the first proof relating to figure 1 (see below) to geometrical principles principle about refraction from De corpore 24.2, which is within the section on geometry.
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Using this principle at De homine 2.2, he argues that the ray from visual point F in figure 1 will not be refracted (irrefractus) because it strikes the eye perpendicularly at point B, and thus will cross through the center of the eye and strike the retina at point D.
13
Figure 1 Diagram from De homine Appendix
At De homine 2.2, Hobbes appeals to a second geometrical principle from De corpore, part III when explaining why a ray from point I which strikes the eye obliquely will, having been refracted, strike the retina at point N, which is to the left of the center of the retina. After the ray from I strikes the retina at N, Hobbes argues that it strikes the center of the eye at point E, which causes point I to appear in a different location, N-E, (punctum visum I apparebit alicubi in N E 12 It may seem strange to refer to DCo, part III as geometry given some of the subjects it addresses (e.g., motion and endeavor), but Hobbes explicitly notes that he is not interested in recapitulating previous geometrical work by Euclid and others. So Hobbes tells the reader that, before reading DCo any further, he should "take into his hands the works of Euclid, Archimedes, and other as well ancient as modern writers" (EW I, 204). As a result, Hobbes states that in part III he includes only the geometry that "…is new, and conducing to natural philosophy" (EW I, 204). 13 OL II, 8.
producta) than it would have if the ray from point I had struck the eye through the line of vision,
i.e., perpendicularly. To support his claim that the ray will strike the center of the eye at E, Hobbes uses a geometrical principle from De corpore 22.6 which states that when a body presses against another body without penetrating it that body will "recede in a straight line perpendicular to its superficies in that point in which it was pressed." 14 This principle explains why the ray from I will appear somewhere in N-E, unlike the ray from F which will appear somewhere in D-
Hobbes's use of geometrical principles from De corpore to provide explanations of optical phenomena is the most relevant aspect of De homine 2 for the present discussion. The first principle supports the claim that there is no refraction through the optic axis, and the second principle explains why the ray from I strikes the center of the eye at E and appears somewhere on "…we define a circle to be a figure made by the circumduction of a straight line in a plane."
23
These definitions must include the way in which figures such as circles can be generated by anyone who understands how to construct them. And Gauthier's view is that such an account, which permits only generative definitions as the basis of scientific demonstrations (i.e., maker's knowledge), frees Hobbes from the charge that geometry and other sciences are based only on definitions that are true merely by convention.
Regarding the second type of definition, Gauthier agrees with McNeilly's view regarding self-evidence, though he demurs on whether we should characterize these definitions as "selfevident." 24 That is, McNeilly argues that Hobbes holds that definitions for things of which we cannot conceive a cause, e.g., 'body' or 'motion', are simply self-evident to us. For Gauthier's primary goal, which is to argue against a conventionalist interpretation such as Martinich's, it is sufficient to discuss only generative definitions. As a result, Gauthier can remain non-committal regarding the status of definitions of things of which we cannot conceive a cause. In the next 20 Gauthier, "Hobbes on Demonstration and Construction," 513-514. 21 Gauthier, "Hobbes on Demonstration and Construction," 514. 22 EW I, 81. 23 EW I, 81-82. Gauthier notes that with such a definition of a circle "we must assume that generative definitions of straight line and plane have already been given" (Gauthier, "Hobbes on Demonstration and Construction," 514). 24 Gauthier, "Hobbes on Demonstration and Construction," 514.
section, I will discuss these definitions and argue that Hobbes's account of these also provides significant evidence against the conventionalist interpretation.
Hobbes and Simplest Conceptions
Though Gauthier grants that definitions for things of which we cannot conceive a cause may be self-evident, it does not seem that Hobbes could agree with this construal. First, in his discussions of such definitions Hobbes does not make use of the concept 'self-evident'. Second, characterizing these definitions as self-evident makes it seem as if Hobbes were making a point about words, i.e., that these definitions need no further evidence than what they possess in themselves as words and are thus justified or warranted (or some other epistemic concept). But
Hobbes does not seem to be interested in these definitions as words; rather, his focus is on the source of these definitions, which I will argue is simplest conceptions that we possess as a result of our experience of the world.
Hobbes's Account in De corpore
Hobbes describes De corpore, parts I-III as providing demonstrations from definitions. In the epistle to the reader, he notes that "in the three former parts of this book all that I have said is sufficiently demonstrated from definitions; and all in the fourth part from suppositions not absurd." 25 The three former parts are on logic, first philosophy, and geometry, respectively, and part IV is on physics (including sensation and sense experience). In De corpore 6 (part I),
Hobbes is concerned with methodology, and there Hobbes describes the definitions we use when constructing geometrical figures.
25 EW I, ix.
In De corpore 6.6, Hobbes sketches how "the part of philosophy …called geometry" came into existence. 26 He claims that definitions explicated from our "simplest conceptions"
provide the basis for definitions in geometry, which contain causes or generations in them:
By the knowledge therefore of universals, and of their causes (which are the first principles by which we know the dióti of things) we have in the first place their definitions, (which are nothing but the explication of our simplest conceptions).
27
Hobbes supplies two examples of this sort of definition, the sort of definition which he says is "nothing but the explication of our simplest conceptions" (conceptuum). 28 The definition of 'place' is the first example. Hobbes says that "he who has a true conception" of it "cannot be ignorant of this definition, place is that space which is possessed or filled adequately by some De corpore 6.6 continues with two additional points: first, Hobbes describes how one might use these definitions, e.g., 'place', in definitions of geometrical objects that incorporate "generations or descriptions", such as the definition of 'line'; and second, Hobbes details how we investigate what sort of motion has certain effects (e.g., "…what motion makes a straight line"). 32 These two additional steps are beyond the focus of the present paper, though the first will be discussed briefly below; what is vital to notice is the importance Hobbes gives to conceptions.
Definitions for things of which we cannot conceive a cause (e.g., 'place') are what
Hobbes calls "explications" of our simplest conceptions that arise in sense experience. As
Hobbes outlines in De corpore 7, the man who remained after the annihilation of the world would still have the conceptions or "ideas of the world," 33 but the only way he would have had these conceptions in the first place is from the sense experiences he had before the annihilation of the world. We possess these simplest conceptions because they are ubiquitous in sense experience. We are unable to conceive of a cause because when we consider their definitions they do not include causes nor do they include particular things, e.g., particular things moving.
We possess a given simplest conception, which we explicate in a definition as 'place', because that simplest conception is something we encounter in all sense experiences of bodies.
For Hobbes only bodies cause our sense experience and all bodies fill a place, so anyone with any sense experience will have the simplest conception 'place'. 34 However, some conceptions which we form in sensory experience are caused by our own body and by not a body outside of us. For example, we do not form some of the conceptions that we associate with sensory experience, such as conceptions of colors, because the bodies outside of us are described by them. At De corpore 25.10, Hobbes distinguishes between conceptions we form from objects outside us and accidents not from objects outside us by arguing that "light and colour, being phantasms of the sentient, cannot be accidents of the object."
35
Hobbes makes both ontological and epistemic claims about color. Regarding their ontology, colors are not properties of objects but "properties of our own bodies." 36 Color is nothing more than "perturbed light" 37 that occurs when light rays meet resistance, e.g., from
prisms. 38 Shining light through a prism causes light rays to be refracted and "diverge from the 34 For Hobbes, the conception 'place' does not function as a proto-Kantian condition for the possibility of experience (more on this below). 35 EW I, 404; also see De homine 2.1, OL II, 7. Hobbes's evidence is as follows: "Which is manifest enough from this, that visible objects appear oftentimes in places in which we know assuredly they are not, and that in different places they are of different colour, and may at one and the same time appear in divers places" (EW I, 404). The key term here is 'appear'. In calling them "phantasms of the sentient" and in highlighting that change of color depends upon change of place, Hobbes shows that such phantasms are consequents of our relation to the object (i.e., dependent upon the light rays hitting our retinae at particular angles) and thus, color cannot be a property of objects (hence, the issue is how objects appear to us, not how they are 40 So particular colors that we perceive are the result of the light rays having been perturbed by refraction either by the atmosphere, which provides a "possible cause" for the moon sometimes appearing red, 41 or by any other refraction, such as when rays enter the eye.
Apart from location, the moon itself does not change, so the color cannot be a property of it;
rather, the color is merely the perturbation of the light rays by whatever resisting media lie between the moon and us.
42
The physical explanations Hobbes provides for color by appealing, e.g., to prisms, do not contradict his view that color is a phantasm of the sentient. On Hobbes's account of the organs of sense, which he provides in De corpore 25.4, action is propagated through some nerve to the brain after the action of an object makes contact with the sentient's body. This motion is further propagated between the brain and the heart, which motion is the beginning of all sense, so that if damage occurs to the pathway between them the motion will no longer be propagated and sensation will not occur. 43 The physical explanations Hobbes provides, then, explain why an object will appear one color sometimes and another color at other times. The difference in this action that makes contact with our body is what causes the difference in color. So when we perceive an object as one particular color we do so because the light has been perturbed in a certain way, but when the light is perturbed in a different way we perceive that same object as a different color. Hobbes also makes an epistemic claim about color. Properties such as "motion, rest, magnitude, and figure" are properties of objects, which we know because they are detected by more than one sense (i.e., sight and touch), but color is not so detected and as a result we know that it is only an appearance. 44 The appearance of color is produced by the object "working upon the senses," 45 for without our perception of the object we would have no sensation of any particular color, but the particular color we perceive, as well as the apparent "place of the image", depends "upon the fabric itself of the eye." 46 Thus, Hobbes believes that we form simple conceptions from our sense experiences and these give us properties of bodies, and they are that out of which we explicate definitions such as 'place'. Hobbes does not detail how exactly experience provides us with these conceptions, but his example of the annihilation of the world makes it clear that they arise in experience because the man who survives can think only of "what is past" 47 (Leviathan 1 relates as well, which is discussed below). Gauthier (1997) highlights these latter definitions and by appeal to these he argues
Hobbes cannot be a conventionalist. But Gauthier does not notice that these definitions that contain the cause or manner of generation depend upon already having other definitions in place.
These definitions already established depend upon our simplest conceptions that we receive from experience, and they constrain what can be constructed in geometry. These definitions are so basic to experience that no person with sense experience can be mistaken about them. This is another piece of evidence that Hobbes is not a conventionalist. That is, the definitions upon which the science of geometry depends do not come from mere convention; rather, they are explications of the simplest conceptions that we have from experience of the world. The only part left up to our will is what we do with these definitions. What we do with them is construct particular geometrical figures, and we apply names so that they may become general.
It is unsurprising that Hobbes places simplest conceptions at the foundation of the science of geometry. Hobbes's definition of philosophy at De corpore 6 shows that whether one begins with effects or with the possible production or generation of effects one still starts with conceptions:
Philosophy is the knowledge (cognitio) we acquire, by true ratiocination, of appearances, or apparent effects, from the knowledge (concepta) of some possible production or generation of the same; and of such production, as has been or may be, from the knowledge (concepto) we have of the effects.
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To explicate these simplest conceptions and arrive at definitions we need language. 
Hobbes's Account in Leviathan
In Leviathan 1, Hobbes argues that our knowledge depends upon conceptions formed from sense experience. There he argues that "the original of them all, is that which we call sense, for there is no conception in a man's mind, which hath not at first, totally, or by parts, been 52 EW I, 3-4. We can ratiocinate "without the use of words" like when "a man see[s] something afar off and obscurely although no appellation had yet been given to anything he will notwithstanding have the same idea (ideam) of that thing for which now by imposing a name on it we call it body" (EW I, 3-4). To this, the man adds new ideas like 'animated' when he sees the thing better. Hobbes often uses 'idea' as a synonym for 'conception' (see fn. 32). 53 EW I, 17. 54 For example, Hobbes does not discuss everything relating to the "natural cause of sense" because it "is not very necessary to the business now in hand" (EW III, 1 …in the right definition of names lies the first use of speech; which is the acquisition of science: and in wrong, or no definitions, lies the first abuse; from which proceed all false and senseless tenets; which make those men that take their instruction from the authority of books, and not from their own meditation.
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Paying attention to one's own "meditation" is crucial when determining whether a definition is correct. Hobbes uses 'meditation' elsewhere in Leviathan to describe the activity by which humans examine the conceptions they have from sense experience. 64 reason, and meditation." 68 Meditating on one's conceptions when evaluating definitions, rather than relying on others' definitions, is preferred because these conceptions come from sense experience, and "natural sense and imagination are not subject to absurdity." 69 The person qualified to be a judge, then, is one who mediates on the conceptions given by sense experience rather than relying on others' potentially absurd definitions. Thus, language and definitions can be a double-edged sword since "as men abound in copiousness of language, so they become more wise, or more mad than ordinary."
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In meditating we determine whether the definition being evaluated matches up with our conceptions. Names that "have a signification also of the nature, disposition, and interest of the speaker" such as such as 'fear' or 'cruelty' can "never be true grounds of any ratiocination" 71 so
we must avoid using them in our reasoning. Such names will never result in demonstrations ending in truth because they do not match with conceptions from our experience of the external world; rather, the conceptions signified by these terms differ according to the speaker's nature and desires (note that this differs from 'equity'; cf. fn. 68).
68 EW III, 269. One might argue that we construct equity just like we construct figures in geometry, which would threaten the reading I have provided of 'meditate'. From his discussions in Leviathan, Hobbes thinks that equity is more fundamental than this, i.e., that it exists apart from our construction. In Leviathan 15, he notes that it inequity in judgment is against the fundamental law of nature because it leads to war (EW III, 142). This equity, arguably, stems from the equality that exists in the state of nature that Hobbes discusses in Leviathan 13. There Hobbes describes this equality as the equal ability to kill any other person (EW III, 110). Furthermore, in Leviathan 30 Hobbes argues that the "safety of the people" depends on the sovereign providing justice with equality, to those that are both "rich and mighty" as well as those who are "poor and obscure." Equity, he says, is "…a precept of the law of nature, [to which] a sovereign is as much subject as any of the meanest of his people" (EW III, 332; emphasis added). Arguing this point fully is beyond the scope of the present paper, but it seems one could argue that we receive our conception 'equity' in experience and, in a way similar to simple conceptions, we use it in constructing the Commonwealth. 69 In Leviathan 5, Hobbes denies that a group of people agreeing about something makes it certain, 72 which seems to be as clear a denial of conventionalism as one could hope to find. Here
Hobbes reiterates the importance of terms having a conception to which they refer, and he provides examples of inconceivable things such as round quadrangles or immaterial substances.
With such terms we "conceive nothing but the sound." 73 Hobbes then explains why one finds absurdity in previous philosophy:
…that there can be nothing so absurd, but may be found in the books of philosophers.
[…] For there is not one of them that begins his ratiocination from the definitions, or explications of the names they are to use; which is a method that hath been used only in geometry; whose conclusions have thereby been made indisputable.
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The crucial term here is 'explication', since Hobbes uses it elsewhere to describe the definitions based upon our simplest conceptions. Apart from where already discussed (De corpore 6.6),
Hobbes uses 'explication' to describe how the names in a definition work at De corpore 6.14,
i.e., they function by raising an idea, or conception, in the mind. 75 The problem with other philosophers is that the definitions with which they begin their ratiocinations cannot raise conceptions because the hearer can have had no such experience (e.g., of immaterial substance).
Having detailed specific reasons for absurd conclusions in Leviathan 5, 76 Hobbes discusses science. Science is not something "born with us" or simply "gotten by experience." 77 Instead, science is "attained by industry; first in apt imposing of names; and secondly by getting 72 "…no one man's reason nor the reason of any one number of men makes the certainty no more than an account is therefore well cast up because a great many men have unanimously approved it" (EW III, 31). 73 EW III, 32. 74 EW III, 33. 75 "Now, seeing definitions (as I have said) are principles, or primary propositions …and seeing they are used for the raising of an idea of some thing in the mind of the learner, whensover that thing has a name, the definition of it can be nothing but the explication of that name by speech" (EW I, 83). When one says the name 'line', it will raise in the mind of the hearer a particular conception, or idea, of a constructed line. 76 a good and orderly method…" 78 This "apt imposing of names" is making sure a name has at least one conception to which it corresponds. Names, however, are general, and they refer to groups of particular conceptions. We will have numerous particular conceptions, e.g., of particular dogs, and the name 'dog' will refer to this group of conceptions. 79 If a name refers to at least one conception then we can use it in reasoning, but if not, it is absurd like 'round quadrangle' and any reasoning following from it will be false.
Thus in both Leviathan and De corpore, Hobbes's account of good definitions is that they must link up through names with conceptions that we receive from experience of the world. Far from being an example of conventionalism, this account places sense experience as the basis for any scientific knowledge, whether in geometry or in civil philosophy. Thus, there are two components to refuting the conventionalist interpretation: first, as Gauthier (1997) argues, Hobbes's requirement that definitions in geometry include their cause or generation prevents geometry from being merely conventional; and second, Hobbes's account of simplest conceptions formed from sense experience prevents such definitions being merely based upon conventions. Though colors are not properties of bodies, they are also not based merely on our conventions. Simplest conceptions come from experience of bodies in the world, but colors are properties of "our bodies" that change relative to various perturbations of light rays. Both colors and simplest conceptions differ from names reflecting our own interests such as 'fear'. The latter are subjective and we should never use them in reasoning.
78 EW III, 35. Prudence provides a contrast to science since it is "gotten by experience only" (EW III, 35); "it is not prudence that distinguisheth man from beast," since prudence is merely a "presumption of the future, contracted from experience of time past" (EW III, 16). To have science, we must have language and impose words upon our conceptions so that they become general; our memory is enabled by our own marks (EW III, 14), as well, and is a condition for improving our own and others' scientific knowledge when our marks become signs (EW III, 15). As a result, children do not have reason and cannot engage in science (EW III, 35-36). 79 As mentioned already, simple conceptions like 'place' differ do not raise a particular thing in the hearer's mind, so they differ from conceptions like 'dog'. to construct these figures do not depend upon our will; rather, they are simplest conceptions that we receive in sense experience.
'Arbitrary' and Conventionalism

'Arbitrary' in
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In Leviathan 5, Hobbes argues that we must be sure that each name we use in a demonstration has at least one conception to which it corresponds. If a name does not have such a corresponding conception, as in the case of 'immaterial substance', then it is absurd. Thus, in
Leviathan the arbitrary part is that which depends upon our will, i.e., the particular name we choose. The conceptions themselves do not depend upon our will, only the choice of a name for a conception does. In both De corpore and Leviathan, Hobbes uses 'arbitrary' to refer not only to the choice of one name over another but also to what we do, or how we act, with the conceptions that we form from sense experience. This latter component is what the present account highlights. In both texts, we choose the names but we also construct. We have discussed at length how we construct geometrical figures, but Hobbes also discusses in Leviathan how we construct the Commonwealth. Thus, on both accounts the definitions with which we begin a demonstration, whether in geometry or in civil philosophy, are not merely conventional but can be traced back to simplest conceptions that we form from experience of the world. 'conventionalism' to describe Hobbes's account elsewhere (e.g., Martinich, Thomas Hobbes, 88). As will be discussed below, Martinich concludes that Hobbes is conflicted between two accounts: his conventionalism and his practice of science. Martinich argues that in addition to Hobbes's conventionalist views, Hobbes is what he calls a "term empiricist" (see Hobbes, 162). As a "term empiricist", Martinich argues that Hobbes terms such as 'rabbit' "hook up" with rabbits in the world. This account, I think, neglects that on Hobbes's account we possess conceptions from sense experience and it is to these conceptions that the names that we choose refer. 88 In contrast to the deductivist interpretation, the relationship between Hobbes's geometry and other sciences is similar to the relationship between first philosophy and geometry. Once one has arrived at the principles of geometry by employing definitions, e.g., of 'place', one may apply those geometrical truths in other contexts. Hobbes does not deduce the science of optics from geometry, but one may use geometrical principles, or definitions, within optics because these definitions are explications of simplest conceptions possessed from experience. The case study from De homine 2 illustrates how Hobbes applies geometrical principles within his optical arguments. Hobbes neither does nor could deduce the conclusions of his optics from his work in geometry; nor would he want to do so. 104 Shapin and Schaffer, The Leviathan and the Air-pump, 150. 105 For Hobbes we can use geometrical principles when providing possible explanations of phenomena because we possess those geometrical principles from experience of the real world. Hobbes distinguishes his geometry from Euclidean geometry by claiming that, as Alexander Bird argues, "Euclidean terms were not names but meaningless symbols" (A. Bird, "Squaring the Circle: Hobbes on Philosophy and Geometry," Journal of the History of Ideas, 57 (1996) , 217-231, here 225). Bird notes that Hobbesian geometric terms, e.g., 'point', have an instantiation in the world, whereas Euclidean geometry has "no application" since none of its terms are instantiated in the world. 
The Conventionalist Interpretation
Conclusion
